According to the Cambodian Defense Ministry, Pol Pot’s army strived to extend their control over areas by attacking the position of the Cambodian army. The ministry’s press release states that at dawn on November 11, 1991, “between 200 and 300 army men of Pol Pot’s Division 785 and Son Sann faction launched an offensive against three positions of the Cambodian army in the region of Kouk Rovieng, between 9 and 12 kilometres north-west of the district seat of Stoung, Kompong Thom Province.” This suggests that a breach of the ceasefire agreement occurred. From November 10 – 14, Pol Pot’s troops (between 70 to 80 infantrymen with artillery support) attacked three positions of a garrison at Puok district in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province. These three assaults were repelled by the local irregular forces. 3
The cessation of hostilities did not hold. On February 28, 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that strongly urged the “Cambodian parties to agree to the complete demobilization of their military forces prior to the end of the process of registration of the elections as well as to the destruction of the weapons and ammunitions deposied (sic) into the Authoriy’s custody in excess of those, if any, which may be deemed necessary by the Authority for the maintenance of civil order and national defense, or which may be required by the new Cambodian Government” (United Nations, 1992). 1
“In June, the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm or allow UN peacekeeping troops on the territory they controlled. KR argued that they did not want to disarm because there still were Vietnamese forces in the country. In mid-July the KR seized six villages and attacked UN helicopters. The UN Security Council at several occasions (S/RES/766 in July, S/RES/783 in October) demanded that KR comply with phase II of the Paris Agreement. On November 30th, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/792 imposing a trade embargo on areas under KR control. On 2 December six UN soldiers were held capture for two days by KR accused of spying” (The New York Times, 1992). 3
Using quotes from the Voice of the People of Cambodia, the BBC reported that ”between 23rd October 1991 and 23rd October 1992, the Khmer Rouge launched 244 shellings and 124 attacks on SOC (State of Cambodia) positions” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1992). The breaches ”resulted in 79 people and a Buddhist monk being killed and 140 others wounded” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1992). “The radio also reported that, according to sources at the SOC’s military coordination committee with the United Nations, the Khmer Rouge recently engaged in activities that violated the SOC sovereignty through their troopsÕ infiltration of zones under SOC control.” 4
On January 4, Prince Sihanouk, Chairman of the Supreme National Council (SNC), declared his withdrawal from the peace process and cooperation with UNTAC. He claimed that the increasing political violence against his party, FUNCINPEC (a French acronym that translates into the ‘National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative CambodiaÕ), and the failure of UNTAC to curtail this violence were main reasons for his withdrawal. After meetings with UNTAC officials, Sihanouk agreed to return to the peace process a week later. In late January, the transitional government forces launched a large-scale military offensive against the Khmer Rouge.
One of the UN Chief Administrators in Cambodia, Gerard Porcell, threatened to resign, citing the reasons for resignation as the UN’s failure to stop the violence and intimidation allegedly carried out by the Khmer Rouge and the CPP (the former government), which is short for the Cambodian People’s Party. Porcell stayed until the May 1993 election. 1 According to the Sydney Morning Herald report from March 31, 1993, “the Khmer Rouge has refused to disarm, which has forced the UN to stop disarming other factions. Cease-fire violations occur almost daily, threatening a key stipulation of the accords that the election be politically neutral and free of intimidation and violence” (Sydney Morning Herald, 1993). 2
On May 28, 1994, the National Assembly delegation and the Royal Government of Cambodia issued a statement in Pyongyang that top representatives of the KOC, namely the National Assembly and the Royal Government, fully accepted the king’s proposal for a cease-fire. However, the ceasefire proposal was rejected by the Khmer Rouge. 1
“The Cambodian parliament adopted legislation here Thursday to outlaw the Khmer Rouge after including amendments to safeguard against human rights abuses. Interior Minister You Hokry said here Tuesday (July 5, 1994) that the authorities were still holding 14 Thai citizens in connection with a failed coup bid during the last weekend. This included the arrest of former Interior Minister Sing Song, Interior Secretary of State Sin Sen and Senior Police Officer Tes Choy. However, the alleged coup plot co-leader Prince Norodom Chakrapong, half brother of Prince Ranariddh, was allowed, through the intervention of his father, the king, to leave the country for Malaysia. The government is currently hunting two interior minister generals and an Undersecretary of State Defense Chhay Sang Yung, all three of whom may have fled to Vietnam.” 2
It was reported that the Khmer Rouge had committed atrocities against civilians in the last three months of the year, as part of their campaign against the government. From April through June attempts to begin peace talks were made, but they fail due to the Khmer Rouge refusal to agree to a ceasefire. 3
The Cambodian government had offered amnesty to members of the Khmer Rouge, which expired on January 15, 1995. According to government figures, almost 2,000 fighters had surrendered in the month prior to January. The government estimated the current strength of the Khmer Rouge was between 5,000 and 10,000 hard-core troops. 1 There were some positive developments in August: members of the Khmer Rouge were reported to have said that they would go to Phnom Penh to lay the groundwork for negotiations with the Cambodian Government in order to end the country’s long-running civil war. The rebels, however, “agreed to the talks once the government dropped demands that a ceasefire be signed before negotiations.” 2 A ceasefire agreement was not reached.
On August 20, a breakaway faction of the Khmer Rouge, which was based in Pailin and led by Pol Pot’s former deputy Ieng Sary, and the Cambodian army agreed to a ceasefire in territories under the rebels’ control. 1 After some political maneuvering, the king signed a royal degree granting amnesty to the defector, Mr. Ieng, on September 16. 2
Though the Khmer Rouge still controlled areas of Cambodia, particularly in the north near Anlong Veng, it had lost more than half of its military strength and the area around Pailin, which was rich in natural resources, including gems and logs.
In 1997, the conflict between the
government and the Khmer Rouge continued, even though clashes became less
intense due to the fact that many KR members had defected.
On February 27, Cambodia’s warring factions agreed to a ceasefire, ending months of fighting between Phnom Penh’s troops and the deposed co-premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s resistance army. This ceasefire agreement completed the first of a four step Japanese peace plan aimed at enabling the exiled prince to return to Cambodia and participate in July’s scheduled elections. 1
The Khmer Rouge guerrilla movement broke the ceasefire agreement between Cambodia’s two main warring political factions on Sunday, March 1, 1998, and vowed to keep fighting the Phnom Penh government. 2 Many KR fighters that had come over to the government with the KR leadership, including Khiev Samphan, defected in December 1998. The last armed resistance ended with the capture of the last remaining KR soldiers, led by Ta Mok in December 1999.
In the 1997 coup, the leader of the royalist faction, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was effectively ousted from his position as co-prime minister by rival Cambodian leader Hun Sen; also, several leaders of the royalist faction, including their military leaders, were executed. More than 5,000 of the royalist fighters who fought against Cambodian armed forces loyal to the CPP during the bloody 1997 coup officially rejoined a united military during a ceremony on Friday, February 26, 1999. The ceremony marked the final integration of the remaining royalist forces into the army. Thousands of Khmer Rouge fighters were also integrated as the guerrilla movement collapsed from mass defections. 1 The ceasefire was finally holding.
The ceasefire was maintained.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part I
Section V. Cease-Fire and Cessation of Outside Military Assistance
Article 9
The cease-fire shall take effect at the time this Agreement enters into force. All forces shall immediately disengage and refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment, movement or action which would extend the territory they control or which might lead to renewed fighting.
The Signatories hereby invite the Security Council of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General to provide good offices to assist in this process until such time as the military component of UNTAC is in position to supervise, monitor and verify it.
Article 10
Upon entry into force of this Agreement, there shall be an immediate cessation of all outside military assistance to all Cambodian Parties.
Annex 2. Withdrawal, cease-fire and related assurance
Article 1. Ceasefire
1. All Cambodian Parties (hereinafter referred to as the Parties) agree to observe a comprehensive ceasefire on land and water and in the air. This ceasefire will be implemented in two phases. During the first phase, the ceasefire will be observed with the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations through his good offices. During the second phase, which should commence as soon as possible, the ceasefire will be supervised, monitored and verified by UNTAC. The Commander of the military component of UNTAC, in consultation with the Parties, shall determine the exact time and date at which the second phase will commence. This date will be set at least four weeks in advance of its coming into effect.
2. The Parties undertake that, upon the signing of this Agreement, they will observe a ceasefire and will order their armed forces immediately to disengage and refrain from all hostilities and any deployment, movement or action that would extend the territory they control or that might lead to a resumption of fighting, pending the commencement of the second phase. Forces are agreed to include all regular, provincial, district, paramilitary and other auxiliary forces.
During the first phase, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will provide his good offices to the Parties to assist them in its observance. The Parties undertake to cooperate with the Secretary-General or his representatives in the exercise of his good offices in this regard.
6. The Parties shall scrupulously observe the ceasefire and will not resume any hostilities by land, water or air. The commanders of their armed forces will ensure that all troops under their command remain on their respective positions, pending their movement to the designated regroupment areas, and refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment or movement or action which would extend the territory they control or which might lead to a resumption of fighting.
Powersharing Transitional GovernmentOn 20 November 1991, Hun Sen — leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Chairman of the State of Cambodia’s Council of Ministers — and Prince Norodom Ranariddh — Secretary-General of FUNCINPEC — signed a memorandum establishing an alliance between the CPP and FUNCINPEC, as did members of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. 2
Throughout the transitional period, the SNC continued to work as the legitimate governing body and source of authority in which the sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia were enshrined.
Elections took place from May 23 to 28, 1993. FUNCINPEC won 58 seats in the Constituent Assembly, CPP won 51, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) won 10, and a fourth political party, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kampuchea (MOLINAKA), won 1. At the June 10 meeting of the SNC, which was presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations declaring that the elections as a whole had been free and fair. The Security Council endorsed the results of the elections with resolution 840 (1993) of June 15. However, the CPP began to make numerous allegations that electoral irregularities had occurred as the counting proceeded. It also requested that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) hold new elections in seven provinces. At the June 10 meeting of the SNC, the CPP announced that it could not recognize the results of the elections and demanded an investigation of the irregularities.
On June 16, FUNCINPEC and the CPP agreed to interim power sharing — an agreement brokered by Sihanouk. As per this agreement, all four political parties that had won representation in the Constituent Assembly would be represented in the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC). FUNCINPEC and the CPP would divide control of the major ministries, and Ranariddh and Hun Sen would serve as Co-Chairs of the PNGC and as Co-Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Public Security.
Ranariddh and Hun Sen met on June 24 to discuss the formation of the PNGC. Although they reached an agreement on the composition of the government, this agreement had not been introduced to the Assembly as of early July. 2 FUNCINPEC, in the Council of Ministers, shared power with the CPP. Given that this was a unique circumstance it can be coded as continuation of power-sharing deals – perhaps of a different nature. (With a resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly on June 14, 1993 to restore monarchy by making the coup of March 18, 1970 null and void, and with the departure of UNTAC on September 21, 1993, the power-sharing agreement between warring parties can be coded as “ended” in Cambodia. Since the SNC was still in place as of June 14, 1993, 1993 can be coded as a year where there was national power-sharing.)
Sihanouk’s proposed formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC), with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, continued into 1994.
Sihanouk’s proposed formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC), with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, continued into 1995.
Joint leadership of the government continued between FUNCINPEC and the CCP (both signatories of the Paris agreement). Power-sharing shifted dramatically in the new coalition government. 1 The CPP never really shared power in the coalition government, but obstructed all efforts by FUNCINPEC to govern. FUNCINPEC, for its part, lacked qualified administrators. The coalition never functioned well, and over the course of the three years, it descended in an ever-worsening spiral.
Power-sharing between FUNCINPEC and the CPP collapsed during the July 7, 1997 coup. Hun Sen, the leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in a brutal, bloody coup. 1 This formally brought about the termination of the power-sharing deals, which had extended beyond 1993 — the year when the Constituent Assembly restored the monarch and UNTAC concluded its mission in Cambodia.
In a July election, Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won 64 of parliament’s 122 seats, but was short of the number required to form a new government alone. The CPP and FUNCINPEC formed a coalition government. The CPP received 12 ministries, FUNCINPEC took 11, and two were shared, while each party appointed a deputy premier. 1 The new government was not evenly split in terms of power; the FUNCINPEC ministries were those that largely provided social services, like education, health, culture, and women’s affairs, while the CPP ministries were those with real power, including defense, interior, finance, and information. In this new arrangement, the CPP secured control over state power. As a matter of fact, this coalition government was formed not because of provisions in the peace agreement but because of the electoral outcome.
Multiparty elections took place in 1998. A coalition government was formed, which was different from the power-sharing provisions in the Paris Agreement.
Multiparty elections took place in 1998. A coalition government was formed, which was different from the power-sharing provisions in the Paris Agreement.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part I
Section III. Supreme National Council
Article 3
The Supreme National Council (hereinafter referred to as “the SNC”) is the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined.
Article 4
The members of the SNC shall be committed to the holding of free and fair elections organized and conducted by the United Nations as the basis for forming a new and legitimate Government.
Article 5
The SNC shall, throughout the transitional period, represent Cambodia externally and occupy the seat of Cambodia at the United Nations, in the United Nations specialized agencies, and in other international institutions and international conferences.
Article 6
The SNC hereby delegates to the United Nations all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement, as described in annex 1.
In order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections, administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of elections will be placed under direct United Nations supervision or control. In that context, special attention will be given to foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information. To reflect the importance of these subjects, UNTAC needs to exercise such control as is necessary to ensure the strict neutrality of the bodies responsible for them. The United Nations, in consultation with the SNC, will identify which agencies, bodies and offices could continue to operate in order to ensure normal day-to-day life in the country.
Article 7
The relationship between the SNC, UNTAC and existing administrative structures is set forth in annex 1.
(Clarification: Why does SNC qualify national power-sharing? After meeting in New York on 27 and 28 August, 1990, the “Big Five”–China, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States–jointly stated that the framework document was composed of five sections “comprising the indispensable requirements for such a settlement”. The Five also called on the parties to the conflict to commit themselves to that process and to form a Supreme National Council as soon as possible on the basis outlined in the document.1 The informal meeting of the parties to the conflict took place in Jakarta on 10 September 1990 and finalized the composition of the SNC. The Cambodian parties present in the informal meeting finalized the 12 member SNC as: Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk (President), the state of Cambodia (six members), KPNLF (2 members), FUNCINPEC (1 Member), Democratic Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge (2 members).2
The process of constitutional reform in Cambodia began after the formalization of the Supreme National Council (SNC) and before the formal signing of the Paris Agreement. On September 25, 1991, the SNC of Cambodia agreed on the number of seats in the Constituent Assembly, the number of members of the Constituent Assembly that could be adopted in a new constitution, and the time frame for the organization of elections. These were supplements to the draft agreement on Cambodia. The SNC decided that there would be 120 seats in the Constituent Assembly, and that the Constituent Assembly could adopt the new constitution only with two-thirds of its membersÕ votes. The Supreme National Council also agreed to organize elections within six months from the first day of electoral registration. 1
The National Assembly of Cambodia amended Cambodia’s constitution to make the constitutional clauses suitable to the new developments in political liberalization. The constitution was now in accordance with democracy and national reconciliation, and also particularly constructed to conform to the implementation of the peace agreement. 2
In a SNC meeting on September 10, “HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk proposed the setting up of a committee to work out the principles for a new constitution and suggested that the committee should be composed of three members from the Phnom Penh administration and one member from each of the other three parties, and the representatives of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) . HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in replying to the question raised by Mr Ieng Muli with regard to the mandate of the SNC and UNTAC, stated that the task of the committee was to facilitate the work of a Constituent Assembly. The proposal of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk was agreed on.” 1
The elections for the Constituent Assembly took place from May 23 to 28, 1993.
The Constitution Drafting Committee began writing the Cambodian constitution on July 1 and finished it on August 18, 1993. The draft of Cambodia’s 120-article constitution was scheduled to be presented to HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Pyongyang, North Korea on August 31, 1993. 1
Debate over the draft constitution began in the Constituent Assembly on September 15, 1993. 2 On September 21, 1993, the Constituent Assembly of Cambodia adopted a new constitution. The new constitution formally adopted a constitutional monarch. 3
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Section I. Transition Period
Article 1
For the purposes of this Agreement, the transitional period shall commence with the entry into force of this Agreement and terminate when the constituent assembly elected through free and fair elections, organized and certified by the United Nations, has approved the constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly, and thereafter a new government has been created.
Part II. Elections
Article 12
The Cambodian people shall have the right to determine their own political future through the free and fair election of a constituent assembly, which will draft and approve a new Cambodian Constitution in accordance with Article 23 and transform itself into a legislative assembly, which will create the new Cambodian Government. This election will be held under United Nations auspices in a neutral political environment with full respect for the national sovereignty of Cambodia.
Part VII. Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia
Article 23
Basic principles, including those regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as regarding Cambodia’s status of neutrality, which the new Cambodian Constitution will incorporate, are set forth in annex 5.
Annex 5. Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia
1. The constitution will be the supreme law of the land. It may be amended only by a designated process involving legislative approval, popular referendum, or both.
2. Cambodia’s tragic recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights. Therefore, the constitution will contain a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including political parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. It will prohibit the retroactive application of criminal law. The declaration will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
3. The constitution will declare Cambodia’s status as a sovereign, independent and neutral State, and the national unity of Cambodian people.
4. The constitution will state that Cambodia will follow a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism. It will provide for periodic and genuine elections. It will provide for the right to vote and to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret ballot, with a requirement that electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process.
5. An independent judiciary will be established, empowered to enforce the rights provided under the constitution.
6. The constitution will be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the constituent assembly.
Electoral/Political Party ReformPolitical party reform began before the signing of the Paris peace agreement. On October 18, 1991, the ruling party in Cambodia, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), declared a formal end to more than 13 years of communism, replacing its president and embracing multiparty democracy and a free-market system. 1 This could be coded as political party reform.
In the Supreme National Council (SNC) meeting, it was unanimously decided that only Cambodians had the right to take part in the electoral process. It was decided that appropriate amendments to the draft electoral law would be drafted in accordance with the above proposals and would be discussed in the Technical Consultative Committee. 1
According to a BBC News report (1992), 2 a draft of the electoral law was presented to the Supreme National Council on April 1, 1992 with the following amendments–
”The right to register to vote at the election is granted to every Cambodian person who is of, or over, the age of 18 years or will attain that age during the period of registration.”
A Cambodian person is defined as
– a person born in Cambodia, with a mother or father born in Cambodia,
– a person born outside of Cambodia, with a mother (or father born) in Cambodia whose mother or father was also born in Cambodia.
”The symbol of a political party cannot be accepted for registration if it contains a portrait of His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk”.
”Voting facilities for overseas voters are to be provided at one polling station in Europe, one in North America and one in Australia. Registration of voters is to take place exclusively in Cambodia”.
”The election campaign period is to start on the day that the (chief) electoral officer publishes the final list of registered parties and ends four days before the start of polling”.
”Any omission which would be an offence if committed during the campaign period shall also be an offence if committed before or after the campaign”.
Parties to the conflict did not agree on the amendments to the electoral law during the August 5, 1992 meeting of the SNC. Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia, used his power as stated in Annex 1, Part D, Paragraph 3A and adopted the law. The electoral law adopted a formula to provide voting rights to Cambodians, as had been stipulated in the 1954 Cambodian Civil Code. The law required that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) prepare elections for Cambodians living abroad, prohibited the use of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s picture as the symbol of a party on the ballots, and also permitted amendments of the bill in accordance with the situation. 3 The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) opposed the draft law on the grounds that it would give voting rights to the Vietnamese.
This could be coded as reform in electoral law.
The registration of voters was to start on October 5, 1992, and 16 parties were expected to be provisionally registered.
Electoral violence continued and the PDK violated the ceasefire agreement. Political parties were violating electoral law. According to a UN source cited in a Reuters report, more than a dozen leading politicians, including Prime Minister Hun Sen, were sent warning letters by UNTAC earlier in the month threatening to end their candidacies if they continued to violate electoral laws. 1 The Constituent Assembly elections took place from May 23 to 28, 1993. “Mr Yasushi Akashi, head of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), yesterday (May 20, 1993) described the just-concluded election campaign as a “success” despite reports of political slayings in outlying provinces. Speaking at the last meeting of Cambodia’s Supreme National Council (SNC) before the May 23-28 elections, he said the 43-day canvassing period had been conducted properly, with “remarkably little campaign-related violence”. He said that more than 800,000 people attended about 1,500 rallies without a single major incident of violence” (The Straits Times, 1993). 2
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part II. Elections
Article 12
The Cambodian people shall have the right to determine their own political future through the free and fair election of a constituent assembly, which will draft and approve a new Cambodian Constitution in accordance with Article 23 and transform itself into a legislative assembly, which will create the new Cambodian Government. This election will be held under United Nations auspices in a neutral political environment with full respect for the national sovereignty of Cambodia.
Article 13
UNTAC shall be responsible for the organization and conduct of these elections based on the provisions of annex 1, section D, and annex 3.
Article 14
All Signatories commit themselves to respect the results of these elections once certified as free and fair by the United Nations.
Annex I
Section D. Elections
1. UNTAC will organize and conduct the election referred to in Part II of this Agreement in accordance with this section and annex 3.
2. UNTAC may consult with the SNC regarding the organization and conduct of the electoral process.
3. In the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to the electoral process, the specific authority of UNTAC will include the following:
a) The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of a system of laws, procedures and administrative measures necessary for the holding of a free and fair election in Cambodia, including the adoption of an electoral law and of a code of conduct regulating participation in the election in a manner consistent with respect for human rights and prohibiting coercion or financial inducement in order to influence voter preference;
b) The suspension or abrogation, in consultation with the SNC, of provisions of existing laws which could defeat the objects and purposes of this Agreement;
c) The design and implementation of a voter education programme, covering all aspects of the election, to support the election process;
d) The design and implementation of a system of voter registration, as a first phase of the electoral process, to ensure that eligible voters have the opportunity to register, and the subsequent preparation of verified voter registration lists;
e) The design and implementation of a system of registration of political parties and lists of candidates;
f) Ensuring fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all political parties contesting in the election;
g) The adoption and implementation of measures to monitor and facilitate the participation of Cambodians in the elections, the political campaign and the balloting procedures;
h) The design and implementation of a system of balloting and polling, to ensure that registered voters have the opportunity to vote;
i) The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of co-ordinated arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers wishing to observe the campaign and voting;
j) Overall direction of polling and the vote count;
k) The identification and investigation of complaints of electoral irregularities, and the taking of appropriate corrective action;
l) Determining whether or not the election was free and fair and, if so, certification of the list of persons duly elected.
4. In carrying out its responsibilities under the present section, UNTAC will establish a system of safeguards to assist it in ensuring the absence of fraud during the electoral process, including arrangements for Cambodian representatives to observe the registration and polling procedures and the provision of an UNTAC mechanism for hearing and deciding complaints.
5. The timetable for the various phases of the electoral process will be determined by UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC as provided in paragraph 2 of this section. The duration of the electoral process will not exceed nine months from the commencement of voter registration.
6. In organizing and conducting the electoral process, UNTAC will make every effort to ensure that the system and procedures adopted are absolutely impartial, while the operational arrangements are as administratively simple and efficient as possible.
Annex III. Elections
1. The constituent assembly referred to in Article 12 of the Agreement shall consist of 120 members. Within three months from the date of the election, it shall complete its tasks of drafting and adopting a new Cambodian Constitution and transform itself into a legislative assembly which will form a new Cambodian Government.
2. The election referred to in Article 12 of the Agreement will be held throughout Cambodia on a provincial basis in accordance with a system of proportional representation on the basis of lists of candidates put forward by political parties.
3. All Cambodians, including those who at the time of signature of this Agreement are Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, will have the same rights, freedoms and opportunities to take part in the electoral process.
4. Every person who has reached the age of eighteen at the time of application to register; or who turns eighteen during the registration period, and who either was born in Cambodia or is the child of a person born in Cambodia, will be eligible to vote in the election.
5. Political parties may be formed by any group of five thousand registered voters. Party platforms shall be consistent with the principles and objectives of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.
6. Party affiliation will be required in order to stand for election to the constituent assembly. Political parties will present lists of candidates standing for election on their behalf, who will be registered voters.
7. Political parties and candidates will be registered in order to stand for election. UNTAC will confirm that political parties and candidates meet the established criteria in order to qualify for participation in the election. Adherence to a Code of Conduct established by UNTAC in consultation with the SNC will be a condition for such participation.
8. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provision made to assist those who are disabled or who cannot read or write.
9. The freedoms of speech, assembly and movement will be fully respected. All registered political parties will enjoy fair access to the media, including the press, television and radio.
Judiciary ReformNo information was available on judiciary reform for 1991.
During the Supreme National Council (SNC) meeting of 10 September 1991, parties discussed issues related to the peace process, including principles governing the Cambodian judicial system, legal code, and legal procedure, as well as various other issues. All parties, except for the Khmer Rouge, were unanimously in agreement on the issues discussed. The Khmer Rouge rejected the documents and principles governing Cambodia’s judicial system, legal code, and legal procedure. 1
In 1993, Hun Sen presented a plan of action for the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC) that suggested that they “improve the judicial system and make it absolutely independent, create appeals courts and provide more judges for provincial and municipal tribunals in order to increase work efficiency in a timely manner” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993). 1
The new Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia was promulgated on September 21, 1993. According to Article 39, “Cambodian citizens shall have the right to sue, appeal and demand reparations for damage caused by the illegal acts of state and social organizations and personnel thereof. Settlement of appeals and reparations of damage shall be under the jurisdiction of the court.”
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
Judicial reform was not extensive. In a newspaper report, a leading Cambodian lawyer said that Cambodia needed to implement extensive legal reforms to accommodate rapid economic changes and instill confidence in foreign investors during this crucial transition period. 1
“The lack of an independent judiciary also continued to pose a problem. A Supreme Council of Magistracy, mandated by Cambodia’s constitution to appoint and discipline judges, was expected to meet for the first time in November, but a Constitutional Council that is to provide independent confirmation of legislative compliance with the constitution had yet to be established.”
On March 19, 1998, the Cambodian parliament passed legislation that created the Constitutional Council as the country’s supreme judicial body. The nine-member council is mandated to interpret Cambodia’s constitution and its laws. 2 The body’s two eldest members, Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum and Son Sann, boycotted the meeting of the Constitutional Council, claiming many of their colleagues were illegally appointed and that the body was stacked in favor of strongman Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The CPP, which effectively controlled Cambodia’s judiciary, would now also control the Constitutional Council. 3 Judiciary reform did not take place.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Annex 5. Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia
Paragraph 5
An independent judiciary will be established, empowered to enforce the rights provided under the constitution.
Military ReformDemobilization was several months behind schedule. Military reform had yet to begin.
After the May 1993 election, the new Army brought together forces previously under the control of former Prime Minister Hun Sen (i.e., the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)), the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The Khmer Rouge fighters were not part of the new armed force, which started offensive attacks against the Khmers. 1 The army remained unreformed and military brutality continued in secret military camps.
The Cambodian military remained the most unorganized armed force. In October 1994, Lieutenant General Proche Bunthol, a spokesman for the general staff, highlighted three main problems with regards to the importance of military reform: “The first problem we have to solve is corruption. Second, we must (be able to) give the real number of soldiers. Third, the military must work to increase security in the country” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1994). In order to reform the national armed force, the government initiated a new bill to reform the army in October 1994. 1
A major military reform took place in Cambodia during March 1995. The Cambodian Defense Ministry announced major cuts in its officer corps, with the number of generals slashed from around 2,000 to a number less than 200. Similarly, the number of colonels after the cuts went down from over 10,000 to 307. All 199 of the one-, two-, and three-star generals survived the reform. 1 The reform was intended to please the major donor countries in order to spur military support.
No developments observed this year.
The new elements of the demobilization process were designed to be part of broader military reform. The demobilization process began after a pause of some years. In December 1998, Tea Banh, Co-Defence Minister, said that the government had formulated a plan to demobilize up to tens of thousands of soldiers each year. 1
A new integrated armed force was formed. The new integrated armed forces fought amongst themselves for two days of clashes in Phnom Penh. FUNCINPEC military leaders were executed in extrajudicial killings.
The demobilization process was a part of broader military reform initiatives. On January 15, 1999, “the Royal Government of Cambodia announced that it would demobilize 79,000 troops – 55,000 soldiers in the Cambodian Royal Armed Forces and 24,000 policemen – over a five-year period. According to a press communiqué from the Information Ministry dated 15th January 15, 1999, Samdech Prime Minister Hun Sen submitted this proposal to the Council of Ministers’ session on the morning of January 15. The proposal was adopted at the meeting. The communiqué further said that, in order to facilitate this demobilization process, the Royal Government planned to set aside a budget to provide 1,200 dollars currency not further specified each to the demobilized personnel who would also be given vocational training in enterprises and guidance to get a job to earn a living.” 1
On 25 February 1999, the Cambodian government appealed to “donor countries and international financial institutions to provide 104m dollars in financial, technical and material support over the next five years for demobilizing 55,000 soldiers. Sok An, senior minister in charge of the office of the council of ministers, made the request in a statement on the opening day of a two-day donor conference in Tokyo. He also disclosed a timetable for downsizing the army, saying 11,500 soldiers would be cut in 2000, 11,000 in 2001, 20,500 in 2002 and the remaining 12,000 in 2003” (BBC, 1999). The government estimated that there were 148,000 soldiers. However, this figure was widely disputed. Upon completion of the program, the government estimated the share of defense in recurrent expenditure would be reduced from the 1998 figure of 35.8 percent to about 20 percent. 2
As part of the reform program, 14 military officials were promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and 23 others to the rank of major-general. The promotions were “part of the army restructuring and demobilization efforts to divert the budget from this sector to the social services.” 3
At a donor conference, Cambodia stated that it had discovered 15,551 “ghost” soldiers and 159,587 dependents. However, purging these individuals from the payroll has been a slow process. It was also reported that, at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated consisted of 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. 4
At a conference, it was reported that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles. 5
More than 5,000 royalist fighters, who had broken away from the Cambodian armed forces following a bloody 1997 coup, officially rejoined the military during a ceremony held on Friday, February 26, 1999. These troops had rebelled after their leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was effectively ousted as co-prime minister by rival Cambodian leader Hun Sen. The ceremony marked the final integration of rebel forces into the army. However, there was a dispute on how many royalist soldiers were integrated. Prince Ranariddh claimed to have 10,000 troops, while Hun Sen’s government claimed to have 5,011. The sides were expected to hold further talks to resolve the dispute. Thousands of Khmer Rouge fighters were integrated into the army in recent months due to the collapse of the guerrilla movement from mass defections. 6
Military reform continued along with the demobilization process. “The last experimental demobilization was held in Battambang Province involving 421 troops starting from 11th July, 2000.” 1 The World Bank was also involved in the demobilization process — it provided 15 million dollars for military demobilization in Cambodia in 2001. The World Food Program (WFP) also promised to provide rice for demobilized soldiers. “In a pilot project, the government had cut off 1,500 soldiers from government’s pay rolls while WFP had assisted. 150 kilograms of rice to each demobilized soldier.” 2 This process was plagued by corruption, so much so that the funders decided to withhold funds.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Annex 2. Withdrawal, Ceasefire and Related Measures
Article V. Ultimate disposition of the forces of the Parties and of their arms, ammunition and equipment
1. In order to reinforce the objectives of a comprehensive political settlement, minimise the risks of a return to warfare, stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the Parties to the conflict, all Parties agree to undertake a phased and balanced process of demobilisation of at least 70 per cent of their military forces. This process shall be undertaken in accordance with a detailed plan to be drawn up by UNTAC on the basis of the information provided under Article I of this annex and in consultation with the Parties. It should be completed prior to the end of the process of registration for the elections and on a date to be determined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
2. The Cambodian Parties hereby commit themselves to demobilise all their remaining forces before or shortly after the elections and, to the extent that full demobilisation is unattainable, to respect and abide by whatever decision the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement takes with regard to the incorporation of parts or all of those forces into a new national army. Upon completion of the demobilisation referred to in paragraph 1, the Cambodian Parties and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall undertake a review regarding the final disposition of the forces remaining in the cantonments, with a view to determining which of the following shall apply:
a) If the Parties agree to proceed with the demobilisation of all or some of the forces remaining in the cantonments, preferably prior to or otherwise shortly after the elections, the Special Representative shall prepare a timetable for so doing, in consultation with them;
b) Should total demobilisation of all of the residual forces before or shortly after the elections not be possible, the Parties hereby undertake to make available all of their forces remaining in cantonments to the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement, for consideration for incorporation into a new national army. They further agree that any such forces which are not incorporated into the new national army will be demobilised forthwith according to a plan to be prepared by the Special Representative. With regard to the ultimate disposition of the remaining forces and all the arms, ammunition and equipment, UNTAC, as it withdraws from Cambodia, shall retain such authority as is necessary to ensure an orderly transfer to the newly elected government of those responsibilities it has exercised during the transitional period.
DemobilizationThe UN force was carrying out reconnaissance throughout the country to prepare for the containment of those troops who would not be demobilized. Containment was expected to take place in early June and demobilization shortly thereafter. 1 As of September 1992, the Khmer armed group remained intact while the rival armies of the two non-communist factions had broken up in anticipation of UN-supervised demobilization. The demobilization was several months behind schedule. 2
Following the beginning of phase II on June 13, 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to have completed the regrouping and cantonment process within four weeks — that is, by July 11. The process was expected to disarm and demobilize 70% of the country’s estimated 200,000 soldiers. As of July 10, of the estimated 200,000 troops, the numbers of cantoned troops were as follows: CPAF, 9,003; ANKI, 3,187; KPNLAF, 1,322 [G1] . However, reflecting the PDK’s position of non-cooperation, no NADK troops were cantoned. 3 “As for the cantonment process, which had begun in June with the declaration of phase II, some 55,000 troops of the three participating factions, or approximately a quarter of the estimated total number of troops, entered the cantonment sites and handed over their weapons. This process, however, had to be suspended, due to the non-compliance by PDK and the deterioration of the military situation. Some 40,000 cantoned troops were subsequently released on agricultural leave, subject to recall by UNTAC” (United Nations). 4
The demobilization and disarmament process was suspended. With the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to respect the terms of “Phase Two,” the other factions stopped disarming and, in most cases, called their demobilized men back into service. 1 A new Cambodian armed force comprised of the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF armies was formed. The demobilization process was terminated without implementation.
With the formation of a new armed force, the demobilization process terminated without implementation.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
The demobilization process began after a pause of some years. In December 1998, Tie Banh, co-defense minister, said that the governments had formulated a plan to demobilize up to tens of thousands of soldiers each year. 1
On February 25, 1999, the Cambodian government “appealed donor countries and international financial institutions to provide 104m dollars in financial, technical and material support over the next five years for demobilizing 55,000 soldiers. Sok An, senior minister in charge of the office of the council of ministers, made the request in a statement on the opening day of a two-day donor conference in Tokyo. He also disclosed a timetable for downsizing the army, saying 11,500 soldiers would be cut in 2000, 11,000 in 2001, 20,500 in 2002 and the remaining 12,000 in 2003” (BBC, 1999). The government estimated that there were 148,000 soldiers. However, this figure was widely disputed. Upon completion of the program, the government estimated that the share of defense in recurrent expenditure would be reduced from the 1998 figure of 35.8 percent to about 20 percent. 2
As part of the reform program, 14 military officials were promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and 23 others to the rank of major-general. The promotions were “part of the army restructuring and demobilization efforts to divert the budget from this sector to the social services” (BBC, 1999). 3
At a donor conference, the Cambodian government stated that it had discovered 15,551 “ghost” soldiers and 159,587 dependents. However, purging these individuals from the payroll has been a slow process. It was also reported that, at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated consisted of 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. In a conference it was stated that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles. 4
“The last experimental demobilization was held in Battambang Province. It involved 421 troops and began on the 11th of July, 2000” (BBC, 2000). 1 The World Bank was also involved in the demobilization process. It provided $15 million dollars for military demobilization in Cambodia in 2001. The World Food Program (WFP) had also promised to provide rice for demobilized soldiers. “In a pilot project, the government had cut off 1,500 soldiers from government’s pay rolls while WFP had assisted 150 kilograms of rice to each demobilized soldier” (Xinhua, 2000). 2 Even if the experimental demobilization ended, there were efforts to demobilize soldiers from the Royal Cambodian Army and downsize the armed force.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Annex 2. Withdrawal Ceasefire and Related Measures
Article III. Regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Parties and storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment
1: In accordance with the operational timetable referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the present annex, all forces of the Parties that are not already in designated cantonment areas will report to designated regroupment areas, which will be established and operated by the military component of UNTAC. These regroupment areas will be established and operational not later than one week prior to the date of the beginning of the second phase. The Parties agree to arrange for all their forces, with all their arms, ammunition and equipment, to report to regroupment areas within two weeks after the beginning of the second phase. All personnel who have reported to the regroupment areas will thereafter be escorted by personnel of the military component of UNTAC, with their arms, ammunition and equipment, to designated cantonment areas. All Parties agree to ensure that personnel reporting to the regroupment areas will be able to do so in full safety and without any hindrance.
2: On the basis of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the present annex, UNTAC will confirm that the regroupment and cantonment processes have been completed in accordance with the plan referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of this annex. UNTAC will endeavour to complete these processes within four weeks from the date of the beginning of the second phase. On the completion of regroupment of all forces and of their movement to cantonment areas, respectively, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC will so inform each of the four Parties.
3: The Parties agree that, as their forces enter the designated cantonment areas, their personnel will be instructed by their commanders to immediately hand over all their arms, ammunition and equipment to UNTAC for storage in the custody of UNTAC.
4: UNTAC will check the arms, ammunition and equipment handed over to it against the lists referred to in paragraph 3. b) of Article 1 of this annex, in order to verify that all the arms, ammunition and equipment in the possession of the Parties have been placed under its custody.
Article IV. Resupply of forces during cantonment
The military component of UNTAC will supervise the resupply of all forces of the Parties during the regroupment and cantonment processes. Such resupply will be confined to items of a non-lethal nature such as food, water, clothing and medical supplies as well as provision of medical care.
Article V. Ultimate disposition of the forces of the Parties and of their arms, ammunition and equipment
1: In order to reinforce the objectives of a comprehensive political settlement, minimize the risks of a return to warfare, stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the Parties to the conflict, all Parties agree to undertake a phased and balanced process of demobilization of at least 70 percent of their military forces. This process shall be undertaken in accordance with a detailed plan to be drawn up by UNTAC on the basis of the information provided under Article 1 of this annex and in consultation with the Parties. It should be completed prior to the end of the process of registration for the elections and on a date to be determined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
2: The Cambodian Parties hereby commit themselves to demobilize all their remaining forces before or shortly after the elections and, to the extent that full demobilization is unattainable, to respect and abide by whatever decision the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement takes with regard to the incorporation of parts or all of those forces into a new national army. Upon completion of the demobilization referred to in paragraph 1, the Cambodian Parties and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall undertake a review regarding the final disposition of the force remaining in the cantonments, with a view to determining which of the following shall apply:
a) If the Parties agree to proceed with the demobilization of all or some of the force remaining in the cantonments, preferably prior to or otherwise shortly after the elections, the Special Representative shall prepare a timetable for so doing, in consultation with them.
b) Should total demobilization of all of the residual forces before or shortly after the elections not be possible, the Parties hereby undertake to make available all of their forces remaining in cantonments to the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement, for consideration for incorporation into a new national army. They further agree that any such forces are not incorporated into the new national army will be demobilized forthwith according to a plan to be prepared by the Special Representative. With regard to the ultimate disposition of the remaining forces and all the arms, ammunition and equipment, UNTAC, as it withdraws from Cambodia, shall retain such authority as is necessary to ensure an orderly transfer to the newly elected government of those responsibilities it has exercised during the transitional period.
DisarmamentNo developments observed this year.
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to have completed the regrouping and cantonment stage within four weeks following the start of phase II of the disarmament process on June 13, 1992 – hence by July 11. The process was expected to disarm and demobilize 70% of the country’s estimated 200,000 soldiers. As of July 10, of the estimated 200,000 troops, the numbers of cantoned troops were as follows: CPAF, 9,003; ANKI, 3,187; KPNLAF, 1,322. However, reflecting PDK’s position of non-cooperation, no NADK troops were cantoned. 2 UNTAC suspended the disarmament of armed groups in Cambodia as the Khmer Rouge had refused to disarm. 3
The demobilization and disarmament process was suspended. With the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to respect the terms of “Phase Two,” the other factions stopped disarming and, in most cases, called their demobilized men back into service. 1 A new Cambodian armed force comprised of the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF armies was formed. The disarmament process terminated without implementation.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
With the formation of a new armed force, the disarmament process did not make any progress. There was a dramatic increase in armaments in the run-up to the July 1997 coup; Rannaridh was convicted on charges of smuggling guns into the country.
No developments observed this year.
At a donor conference in March 1999, the government of Cambodia stated that it had discovered 15,551 “ghost” soldiers and 159,587 dependents. However purging these individuals from the payroll has been a slow process. It was also reported that at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated constituted 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. In a conference, it was stated that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles. 1
PARIS AGREEMENT
Annex 2. Withdrawal Ceasefire and Related Measures
Article VII. Caches of weapons and military supplies
1: In order to stabilize the security situation, build confidence and reduce arms and military supplies throughout Cambodia, each Party agrees to provide to the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, before a date to be determined by him, all information at is disposal, including marked maps, about known or suspected caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia.
2: On the basis of information received, the military component of UNTAC shall, after the date referred to in paragraph 1, deploy verification teams to investigate each report and destroy each cache found.
Article IX. Unexploded ordnance devices
1: Soon after arrival in Cambodia, the military component of UNTAC shall ensure, as a first step, that all known minefields are clearly marked.
2: The Parties agree that, after completion of the regroupment and cantonment processes in accordance with Article III of the present annex, they will make available mine-clearing teams which, under the supervision and control of UNTAC military personnel, will leave the cantonment areas in order to assist in removing, disarming or deactivating remaining unexploded ordnance devices. Those mines or objects which cannot be removed, disarmed or deactivated will be clearly marked in accordance with a system to be devised by the military component of UNTAC.
3: UNTAC shall: a) Conduct a mass public education programme in the recognition and avoidance of explosive devices.
b) Train Cambodian volunteers to dispose of unexploded ordnance devices.
c) Provide emergency first-aid training to Cambodian volunteers.
Article X. Investigation of violations
1: After the beginning of the second phase, upon receipt of any information or complaint from one of the Parties relating to a possible case of non-compliance with any of the provisions of the present annex or related provisions, UNTAC will undertake an investigation in the manner which it deems appropriate. Where the investigation takes place in response to a complaint by one of the Parties, that Party will be required to make personnel available to accompany the UNTAC investigators. The results of such investigation will be conveyed by UNTAC to the complaining Party and the Party complained against, and if necessary to the SNC.
2: UNTAC will also carry out investigations on its own initiative in other cases when it has reason to believe or suspect that a violation of this annex or related provisions may be taking place.
ReintegrationNo developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
After the May 1993 election, the new army brought together forces previously under the control of former Prime Minister Hun Sen (or CPP), the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The newly formed armed force started offensive attacks against the Khmers. 1 The Khmer Rouge fighters were not part of the new armed force. No reintegration of former combatants into civilian life took place.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
A new integrated armed force was formed. Splinter factions from the Khmer Rouge were integrated into a new armed force. The Cambodian government was in the process of downsizing the armed force and reintegrating the demobilized personnel into civilian life.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Annex 2. Withdrawal Ceasefire and Related Measures
Article V. Ultimate disposition of the forces of the Parties and of their arms, ammunition and equipment
Paragraph 3
UNTAC will assist, as required, with the reintegration into civilian life of the force demobilized prior to the elections.
Prisoner ReleaseAfter the signing of the peace agreement on October 23, 1991, the political situation improved but the State of Cambodia (SOC) did not stop holding political prisoners. The Cambodian Deputy Interior Minister, Sin Sen, said on November 13 that the government in Phnom Penh was holding close to 1,000 political prisoners. AFP cited the minister as saying that political prisoners would be released “soon”, as long as they “did not create any loss or destruction against the people.” However, it was hinted that POWs might not be freed. 2
“In the latter half of 1993, for the first time in decades, there were no political prisoners being held in Cambodia, except possibly persons detained in Khmer Rouge areas” (U.S. Department of State, 1994). 1 “Cambodia Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State, January 31, 1994, accessed July 30, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_eap…
“Although the practice of holding political prisoners, common under the SOC, has all but disappeared, there were a few cases in which persons were detained for political reasons. Newspaper editor Nguon Non was detained in July on national security charges and released in August pending trial; there is widespread speculation that he was arrested because the Government disapproved of his coverage of the July coup attempt (see Section 2.a.). A human rights worker for the NGO Adhoc in Prey Veng province was detained from November 1993 to February 1994 under an antiterrorism law; his alleged act of ‘terrorÔ was that he created instability and chaos by encouraging villagers to reclaim their property. Human rights groups believe his detention was an act of retaliation on the part of local authorities who suspected him of being the source of a news article describing the corrupt handling of land disputes by officials. Human rights observers also believe that several prisoners held in various areas on suspicion of being Khmer Rouge members were detained for political reasons” (U.S. Department of State, 1995). 1 “Cambodia Human Rights Practices, 1994,” U.S. Department of State, February 1995, accessed July 30, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_eap…
According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, there was no report of political prisoners in 1996. 1 “Cambodia Human Rights Practices, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, March 1996, accessed July 30, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_eap…
According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, the Cambodian “government often arrests persons on questionable criminal charges, usually drug trafficking or espionage, when their actual ‘offensesÕ are political” (U.S. Department of State, 1997). 1 “Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1997, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/cambodia.ht…
According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, in 1997 “there was at least one political prisoner. In a flawed September trial, Khmer Nation Party official Srun Vong Vannak and two others were sentenced to prison for their alleged roles in the November 1996 murder of Kov Samuth, the brother-in-law of Mrs. Hun Sen” (U.S. Department of State, 1998). 1 “Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1998, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/cambodia.ht…
According to the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices, there was no report of political prisoners in 1998. 1 “Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” U.S. Department of State, February 26, 1999, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/cambodia.ht…
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part VI. Release of Prisoners of War and Civilian Interests
Article 21
The release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees shall be accomplished at the earliest possible date under the direction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in coordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with the assistance, as necessary, of other appropriate international humanitarian organizations and the Signatories.
Article 22
The expression civilian internees refers to all persons who are not prisoners of war and who, having contributed in any way whatsoever to the armed or political struggle, have been arrested or detained by any of the parties by virtue of their contribution thereto.
Annex 2. Withdrawal Ceasefire and Related Measures
Article 11. Release of prisoners of war
The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as required to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the latter discharge of its functions relating to the release of prisoners of war.
Paramilitary GroupsNo developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
No developments observed this year.
Hun Sen deposed Ranariddh with support from personal and state armed forces.
It was reported that the International Monetary Fund had condemned Cambodia’s declining tax-collection efficiency and the reckless and illegal exploitation of forest resources by the rival parties. The state became increasingly impoverished and directionless, and the ordinary people increasingly demoralized. Tension in Phnom Penh mounted in early 1997, as private armies of bodyguards and paramilitary forces loyal to Ranariddh or Hun Sen confronted each other. 1
At a donor conference in March 1999, the government of Cambodia stated that at the end of September 1999, the number of illegal weapons confiscated consisted of 16,412 rifles, 11 land mines, and 345 hand grenades. It was reported that people had voluntarily turned in 5,655 rifles, 190 hand grenades, and 332 land mines, and that the government had destroyed 20,112 rifles. 1
More than 5,000 royalist fighters who had broken away from the Cambodian armed forces following a bloody 1997 coup officially rejoined the armed forces during a ceremony held on Friday, February 26, 1999. The troops had rebelled after their leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was effectively ousted as co-prime minister by rival Cambodian leader Hun Sen. The ceremony marked the final integration of rebel forces into the army. Thousands of Khmer Rouge fighters were integrated into the army in the months following the collapse of the guerrilla movement, brought about by mass defections. 2
Both of these incidents were considered as initiatives to deal with the militia or paramilitary forces. However, they were not considered as concrete steps taken beyond the scope of the military reform.
Some significant steps were taken in 1999. There was no information on the existence of a paramilitary force.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Annex 2. Withdrawal Ceasefire and Related Measures
Article I. Cease-fire
2: The Parties undertake that, upon the signing of this Agreement, they will observe a cease-fire and will order their armed force immediately to disengage and refrain from all hostilities and any deployment, movement or action that would extend the territory they control or that might lead to as resumption of fighting, pending the commencement of the second phase. Forces are agreed to include all regular, provincial, district, paramilitary and other auxiliary forces. During the first phase, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will provide his good offices to the Parties to assist them in its observance. The Parties undertake to cooperate with the Secretary-General or his representatives in the exercise of his good offices in this regard.
Human RightsWith the signing of the Paris Agreement in October 1991, restrictions on freedom of association were lifted and it became possible to establish human rights monitoring organizations. 1 Other human rights components were not implemented in 1991 due to the fact that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was yet to be established in Cambodia. UNTAC would have the responsibility of fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were ensured and where free and fair elections might take place during the transitional period. 2
On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland. 3 The return of refugees and displaced persons was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.
On April 20, 1992, the Khmer Rouge, together with the leaders of Cambodia’s three other mutually hostile factions, signed two international covenants that committed them to far-reaching respect for human rights. 1 The Supreme National Council then ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On September 10, the SNC agreed to accede to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
“The Paris Agreements gave UNTAC the responsibility during the transitional period for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were ensured and where free and fair elections might take place” (United Nations). 2
“The UNTAC human rights component was active in three broad areas. First, it encouraged SNC to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments and undertook a review of the existing judicial and penal systems in the light of international provisions. Secondly, it conducted an extensive human rights information and education campaign in close cooperation with the Information/Education Division of UNTAC. Thirdly, it investigated human rights-related complaints and took corrective measures where necessary. Human rights officers were progressively deployed in all 21 provinces in Cambodia, including in the zones controlled by FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. However, the component had no access to the zones controlled by PDK” (United Nations). 3
“UNTAC developed a human rights education programme with particular reference to teacher training, dissemination of relevant international instruments, education of health professionals, training of public and political officials and support for local human rights organizations. Educational materials, posters, leaflets, stickers and other printed materials were disseminated throughout the country. Human rights training was introduced into the Cambodian education system, and human rights studies were incorporated in the curriculum of Phnom Penh University’s Law School and Medical Faculty. Collaboration with local human rights organizations was an important aspect of UNTAC’s work. UNTAC provided them with materials, training and expertise as well as small grants for basic office expenses. It organized an International Symposium on Human Rights in Cambodia from 30 November to 2 December 1992, and conducted a special course for human rights advocates, including a training programme on United Nations human rights procedures and a special training programme dealing with human rights issues in the electoral process. One of the most important things that happened during this time period was the growth of civil society organizations like Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (Licado), Cambodia Human Rights and Development Association (Adhoc) and center for Human Rights. These civil society organizations, however, were largely funded by international actors” (United Nations). 4
“As part of the effort to promote the development of an independent judiciary, a major programme of training for judges, defence lawyers and public defenders was initiated. Training sessions for officials of the existing administrative structures and professional or activist groups were undertaken in almost every province. Participants included representatives of political parties, members of human rights associations, teacher trainees, justice officials and police. UNTAC closely monitored conditions of detention in civil prisons throughout Cambodia and pressed local authorities to improve the situation to the extent possible within the means available to the prison administration. It investigated all cases of prisoners whose detention might be politically motivated” (United Nations). 5
As the Khmer Rouge resumed the guerilla insurgency, the human rights situation became worse. Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia were frequently targeted by the Khmer. Regarding violence against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, UNTAC and the person in charge of human rights in Cambodia said that the Cambodian government was responsible for the protection of Vietnamese residents and that the United National could only observe the situation and adopt a wait-and-see policy. UNTAC’s stance on this, however, was rejected by the Vietnamese government because the Paris Agreement clearly pointed out that the UN was responsible for acting as the guarantor of human rights during the transitional period. 1
In May 1993, more than four million Cambodians went to the polls to vote in their first free election since the 1950s, even though the UN-administered elections were held amid much fear and uncertainty due to the outbreak of fighting around the country. 2
Repatriated refugees and displaced persons were ensured voting rights in the post-conflict Constituent Assembly election. After the Constituent Assembly election, UNTAC initiated a vigorous debate in the General Assembly over the creation of a national human rights commission. 3
The human rights situation remained very poor. According to a UN Report, Cambodian military authorities in the northwest had been abducting people for ransom, executing them and then eating their livers in a gruesome ritual thought to imbue them with power. An investigation by the Ministry of Defense corroborated most details of the U.N. Centre’s reports, but investigators from the Prime Ministers’ office initially denied the findings. Cambodia’s Co-Premiers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen then ordered a second investigation, but its findings, published on July 22, were inconclusive about the existence of the Cheu Kmau detention center. It did not deny the existence of the secret prison, but said that Khmer Rouge activity in the area made further inquiries too dangerous. 2
The Human Rights situation continued to deteriorate.
In May 1995, the Cambodian government said that constitutional guarantees to ensure human rights were in place, and asked the UN Human Rights Center to leave Cambodia. The international human rights organization, however, called the decision premature. 1
On May 4, 1995, the Cambodian government agreed to a continued U.N. human rights presence in Cambodia but called for amendments to the mandate of the U.N. Centre for Human Rights (UNMCHR). 2
In a meeting held on May 4, 1995, the first and second prime ministers of the Kingdom of Cambodia said that the Royal Government of Cambodia [RGC] would willingly accept the five-point proposal of the United Nations because it was very applicable. These five points were:
(a) regular consultations be held unofficially every three months between the RGC and the UN Human Rights Office in Cambodia; (b) a meeting be held every year, two months before the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Office, between the RGC and the UN to enable the UN to understand Cambodia’s difficulties; (c) consultations be held before any report is sent to Geneva; (d) the RGC should allow the UN Human Rights Office to arrange seminars on human rights for administrative personnel; and (e) if the RGC accepts the four aforementioned points, the UN Human Rights Office will invite the RGC to Geneva to gain experience on human rights activities to be utilized in Cambodia. 3
According to the Human Rights Watch World Report of 1998, “in February 1997,factional fighting erupted in Battambang province between FUNCINPEC and CPP forces, with human rights workers reporting as many as twenty soldiers killed during the armed clashes. On March 30 (1997), a grenade attack on a peaceful rally in front of the National Assembly led by KNP President Sam Rainsy left at least sixteen dead and more than one hundred wounded. The two prime ministers continued to build up their personal arsenals and private armies, with Hun Sen’s security forces numbering at least 1,500 and Ranariddh’s approaching 1,000. Tensions continued to escalate as the two factions competed to recruit defecting Khmer Rouge units, as well as to build new rival political alliances, which led to virtual paralysis of the fragile coalition. The beginning of the National Assembly’s planned three-month session, slated originally for April 21, was postponed after divisions broke out within FUNCINPEC, with a renegade faction led by Minister of State Ung Phan and Siem Reap Governor Toan Chay announcing their intention to oust Ranariddh. During the ensuing political stalemate, the National Assembly failed to convene for nearly six months, holding up passage of crucial legislation regulating the upcoming elections, nongovernmental organization (NGO) activity, political parties, and access to broadcasting frequencies” (Human Rights Watch, 1998).
The human rights situation was worse in 1998. Amid the preparation for general elections, UN Officials came to Cambodia to assess the human rights situation. After visiting for four days, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, said that there were very serious issues that needed to be resolved. She suggested that the government had a responsibility to bring about an environment that would facilitate a free and fair election. 1
According to the 1999 Human Rights Watch World Report, “A pattern of violence against opposition party workers continued late into the year. Prior to Ranariddh’s return on March 3, several high-ranking FUNCINPEC officials were assassinated in Phnom Penh, including Lt. Col. Moung Sameth on March 3, Gen. Thach Kim Sang on March 4, and Lt. Col. Chea Vutha on March 28. Local activists in the countryside were also targeted, as for example in the April 26 grenade attack against Son Sann Party members in Takeo, in which two people were killed”. 2 The government crackdown continued after a grenade attack on Hun Sen’s residence occurred on September 7. A Human Rights Watch Report stated that, “the government banned sixty-eight opposition politicians from leaving the country and threatened that some would be arrested. While the travel ban was effectively lifted on September 24 for most opposition leaders, Son Sann Party candidate Kem Sokha, the former chairman of the National Assembly’s Human Rights Commission, continued to be barred from leaving the country. In late September he went into hiding after a court summons was issued in connection with his role in the September demonstrations” (Human Rights Watch, 1999). 3
Despite these issues, there were some positive developments. Cambodia’s main political parties agreed to delay the trial of captured Khmer Rouge military chief Ta Mok until he could be charged with genocide. 2 After the Cambodian government rejected an earlier proposal to try Pol Pot’s former associates in a fully independent international tribunal, the UN developed detailed plans for a joint war crimes tribunal. This tribunal would be held in Cambodia and presided over by Cambodian and foreign judges. It was suggested that these judges try the former political and military leaders of the Khmer Rouge in a single trial. 3
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part III. Human Rights
Article 15
1. All persons in Cambodia and all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.
1. Cambodia undertakes:
* to ensure respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia;
* to support the right of all Cambodian citizens to undertake activities which would promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
* to take effective measures to ensure that the policies and practices of the past shall never be allowed to return;
* to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments;
2. the other Signatories to this Agreement undertake to promote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia as embodied in the relevant international instruments and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, in order, in particular, to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses.
Article 16
UNTAC shall be responsible during the transitional period for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights shall be ensured, based on the provisions of annex 1, section E.
Article 17
After the end of the transitional period, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights should continue to monitor closely the human rights situation in Cambodia, including, if necessary, by the appointment of a Special Rapporteur who would report his findings annually to the Commission and to the General Assembly.
Annex 1
Section E. Human Rights
In accordance with Article 16, UNTAC will make provisions for:
a) The development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights;
b) General human rights oversight during the transitional period;
c) The investigation of human rights complaints, and, where appropriate, corrective action.
Annex 5
Paragraph 2
Cambodia’s tragic recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights. Therefore, the constitution will contain a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including political parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. It will prohibit the retroactive application of criminal law. The declaration will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
Annex 5
Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia
3. Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia
Article 3
1. All persons in Cambodia shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.
1. Cambodia undertakes:
* to ensure respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia;
* to support the right of all Cambodian citizens to undertake activities that would promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
* to take effective measures to ensure that the policies and practices of the past shall never be allowed to return:
* to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments;
2. The other parties to this Agreement undertake to promote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia as embodied in the relevant international instruments in order, in particular, to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses.
3. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights should continue to monitor closely the human rights situation in Cambodia, including, if necessary, by the appointment of a Special Rapporteur who would report his findings annually to the Commission and to the General Assembly.
In order to facilitate the return of IDPs and repatriation of Cambodian refugees, the Australian government provided $1 million to the first stage of one of the largest rebuilding projects in history. 2
On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the UNHCR. This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland. 3 The return of refugees and IDPs was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.
According to the Human Rights Watch Annual Report, at the end of 1992, the UNHCR had safely transported over 200,000 refugees back to Cambodia. However, the repatriation plan had been reformulated several times throughout the process, weakening safeguards that were to ensure the free choice of destination on the part of refugees. The diminished protection was significant because the political factions controlling the Thai border camps were seeking to maintain their control by coercing some refugees to resettle in their small “zones” near the border. 1 As part of the repatriation program, every returning family was promised two hectares of farmland. 2 However, three months into the repatriation process, the UNHCR had found almost no suitable land for the returnees. In Battambang province, where most returnees wanted to settle, more than half the farmland was believed to be mined. The remaining land was unavailable. Therefore, the UNHCR was forced to redesign its repatriation package. Instead of farmland, the returnees were now offered a village house, tools for a new business, or cash – $50 per adult and $25 per child. 3
The repatriation of Cambodian refugees in Thailand progressed as scheduled. Altogether, 231,358 people had been repatriated back to Cambodia as of January 1, 1993; 124,959 Cambodians remained on Thai soil. 1
“According to Lt-Gen Sanan Khachonklam, head of the Coordination Centre for the Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees, a total of 339,109 Cambodian refugees and displaced people, or 78,231 families, had been repatriated under the programme,” according to a report on the radio. “Meanwhile, 18,000 Cambodians have returned by themselves. After the departure of today’s group of 525 refugees, about 16,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons will remain at Site 2. They will be repatriated gradually, and all will be back in Cambodia by April” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993). 2
By the end of April 1993, 370,000 Cambodian refugees and “displaced persons” marked the beginning of a much longer and more difficult process of resettlement and reintegration. 3
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part III: Article 15: Paragraph 1
All persons in Cambodia and all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.
Part V. Refugees and Displaced Persons
Article 19
Upon entry into force of this Agreement, every effort will be made to create in Cambodia political, economic and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious integration of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.
Article 20
1) Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, located outside Cambodia, shall have the right to return to Cambodia and to live in safety, security and dignity, free from intimidation or coercion of any kind.
2) The Signatories request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to facilitate the repatriation in safety and dignity of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, as an integral part of the comprehensive political settlement and under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in accordance with the guidelines and principles on the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons as set forth in annex
Annex 2
Article XII. Repatriation and resettlement of displaced Cambodians
The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as necessary in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons carried out in accordance with Articles 19 and 20 of this Agreement, in particular in the clearing of mines from repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas, as well as in the protection of the reception centres.
Annex 4. Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees and Displaced Persons: Part I: Introduction
1. As part of the comprehensive political settlement, every assistance will need to be given to Cambodian refugees and displaced persons as well as to countries of temporary refuge and the country of origin in order to facilitate the voluntary return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in a peaceful and orderly manner. It must also be ensured that there would be no residual problems for the countries of temporary refuge. The country of origin with responsibility towards its own people will accept their return as conditions become conducive.
Part II: Conditions Conducive to the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons
2. The task of rebuilding the Cambodian nation will require the harnessing of all its human and natural resources. To this end, the return to the place of their choice of Cambodians from their temporary refuge and elsewhere outside their country of origin will make a major contribution.
3. Every effort should be made to ensure that the conditions which have led to a large number of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons seeking refuge in other countries should not recur. Nevertheless, some Cambodian refugees and displaced persons will wish and be able to return spontaneously to their homeland.
4. There must be full respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cambodians, including those of the repatriated refugees and displaced persons, in recognition of their entitlement to live in peace and security, free from intimidation and coercion of any kind. These rights would include, inter alia, freedom of movement within Cambodia, the choice of domicile and employment, and the right to property.
5. In accordance with the comprehensive political settlement, every effort should be made to create concurrently in Cambodia political, economic and social conditions conducive to the return and harmonious integration of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.
6. With a view to ensuring that refugees and displaced persons participate in the elections, mass repatriation should commence and be completed as soon as possible, taking into account all the political, humanitarian, logistical, technical and socio-economic factors involved, and with the cooperation of the SNC.
7. Repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons should be voluntary and their decision should be taken in full possession of the facts. Choice of destination within Cambodia should be that of the individual. The unity of the family must be preserved.
Part III. Operational Factors
8. Consistent with respect for principles of national sovereignty in the countries of temporary refuge and origin, and in close cooperation with the countries of temporary refuge and origin, full access by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), CRC and other relevant international agencies should be guaranteed to all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, with a view to the agencies undertaking the census, tracing, medical assistance, food distribution and other activities vital to the discharge of their mandate and operational responsibilities; such access should also be provided in Cambodia to enable the relevant international organizations to carry out their traditional monitoring as well as operational responsibilities.
9. In the context of the comprehensive political settlement, the Signatories note with satisfaction that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has entrusted UNHCR with the role of leadership and co-ordination among intergovernmental agencies assisting with the repatriation and relief of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons. The Signatories look to all non-governmental organizations to co-ordinate as much as possible their work for the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons with that of UNHCR.
10. The SNC, the Governments of the countries in which the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons have sought temporary refuge, and the countries which contribute to the repatriation and integration effort will wish to monitor closely and facilitate the repatriation of the returnees. An ad hoc consultative body should be established for a limited term for these purposes. The UNHCR, the ICRC, and other international agencies as appropriate, as well as UNTAC, would be invited to join as full participants.
11. Adequately monitored short-term repatriation assistance should be provided on an impartial basis to enable the families and individuals returning to Cambodia to establish their lives and livelihoods harmoniously in their society. These interim measures would be phased out and replaced in the longer term by the reconstruction programme.
12. Those responsible for organizing and supervising the repatriation operation will need to ensure that conditions of security are created for the movement of the refugees and displaced persons. In this respect, it is imperative that appropriate border crossing points and routes be designated and cleared of mines and other hazards.
13. The international community should contribute generously to the financial requirements of the repatriation operation.
Internally Displaced PersonsIn order to facilitate the return of IDPs and repatriation of Cambodian refugees, the Australian government provided $1 million to the first stage of one of the largest rebuilding projects in history. 2
On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the UNHCR. This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland. 3 The return of refugees and IDPs was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.
While the refugee resettlement program was moving smoothly, the resettlement of internally displaced persons did not get much attention during its initial phase. Unlike their countrymen who had crossed over the border, IDPs did not have a vast aid program overseeing their welfare. 1 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided 139,548 US dollars for dry-season agricultural assistance to IDPs in south-west Cambodia. “The project will provide for the procurement, transport and distribution of rice seed, fertilizer and insecticide to displaced persons, as well as assisting in land preparation (mechanized and manual) and supervision of planting and harvesting” (BBC, 1992). 2
By the end of April 1993, about 165,000 internally displaced persons, who were driven from their land and means of livelihood by fighting and insecurity, joined the resettlement and reintegration program, along with 370,000 refugees and displaced persons along the Cambodia and Thailand border. 1
People were displaced by fighting between government forces and the Khmer Rouge in 1994-95.
People were displaced by fighting between government forces and the Khmer Rouge in 1994-95.
No developments observed this year.
People were displaced by fighting in 1997-98.
People were displaced by fighting in 1997-98.
No further developments observed.
No further developments observed.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part III: Article 15: Paragraph 1
All persons in Cambodia and all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.
Part V. Refugees and Displaced Persons
Article 19
Upon entry into force of this Agreement, every effort will be made to create in Cambodia political, economic and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious integration of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.
Article 20
1) Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, located outside Cambodia, shall have the right to return to Cambodia and to live in safety, security and dignity, free from intimidation or coercion of any kind.
2) The Signatories request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to facilitate the repatriation in safety and dignity of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, as an integral part of the comprehensive political settlement and under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in accordance with the guidelines and principles on the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons as set forth in annex 4.
Annex 2
Article XII. Repatriation and resettlement of displaced Cambodians
The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as necessary in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons carried out in accordance with Articles 19 and 20 of this Agreement, in particular in the clearing of mines from repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas, as well as in the protection of the reception centres.
Annex 4. Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees and Displaced Persons: Part I: Introduction
1. As part of the comprehensive political settlement, every assistance will need to be given to Cambodian refugees and displaced persons as well as to countries of temporary refuge and the country of origin in order to facilitate the voluntary return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in a peaceful and orderly manner. It must also be ensured that there would be no residual problems for the countries of temporary refuge. The country of origin with responsibility towards its own people will accept their return as conditions become conducive.
Part II. Conditions Conducive to the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons
2. The task of rebuilding the Cambodian nation will require the harnessing of all its human and natural resources. To this end, the return to the place of their choice of Cambodians from their temporary refuge and elsewhere outside their country of origin will make a major contribution.
3. Every effort should be made to ensure that the conditions which have led to a large number of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons seeking refuge in other countries should not recur. Nevertheless, some Cambodian refugees and displaced persons will wish and be able to return spontaneously to their homeland.
4. There must be full respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cambodians, including those of the repatriated refugees and displaced persons, in recognition of their entitlement to live in peace and security, free from intimidation and coercion of any kind. These rights would include, inter alia, freedom of movement within Cambodia, the choice of domicile and employment, and the right to property.
5. In accordance with the comprehensive political settlement, every effort should be made to create concurrently in Cambodia political, economic and social conditions conducive to the return and harmonious integration of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.
6. With a view to ensuring that refugees and displaced persons participate in the elections, mass repatriation should commence and be completed as soon as possible, taking into account all the political, humanitarian, logistical, technical and socio-economic factors involved, and with the cooperation of the SNC.
7. Repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons should be voluntary and their decision should be taken in full possession of the facts. Choice of destination within Cambodia should be that of the individual. The unity of the family must be preserved.
Part III. Operational Factors
8. Consistent with respect for principles of national sovereignty in the countries of temporary refuge and origin, and in close cooperation with the countries of temporary refuge and origin, full access by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), CRC and other relevant international agencies should be guaranteed to all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, with a view to the agencies undertaking the census, tracing, medical assistance, food distribution and other activities vital to the discharge of their mandate and operational responsibilities; such access should also be provided in Cambodia to enable the relevant international organizations to carry out their traditional monitoring as well as operational responsibilities.
9. In the context of the comprehensive political settlement, the Signatories note with satisfaction that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has entrusted UNHCR with the role of leadership and co-ordination among intergovernmental agencies assisting with the repatriation and relief of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons. The Signatories look to all non-governmental organizations to co-ordinate as much as possible their work for the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons with that of UNHCR.
10. The SNC, the Governments of the countries in which the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons have sought temporary refuge, and the countries which contribute to the repatriation and integration effort will wish to monitor closely and facilitate the repatriation of the returnees. An ad hoc consultative body should be established for a limited term for these purposes. The UNHCR, the ICRC, and other international agencies as appropriate, as well as UNTAC, would be invited to join as full participants.
11. Adequately monitored short-term repatriation assistance should be provided on an impartial basis to enable the families and individuals returning to Cambodia to establish their lives and livelihoods harmoniously in their society. These interim measures would be phased out and replaced in the longer term by the reconstruction programme.
12. Those responsible for organizing and supervising the repatriation operation will need to ensure that conditions of security are created for the movement of the refugees and displaced persons. In this respect, it is imperative that appropriate border crossing points and routes be designated and cleared of mines and other hazards.
13. The international community should contribute generously to the financial requirements of the repatriation operation.
Economic and Social DevelopmentPost-war reconstruction of Cambodia began immediately after the signing of the Paris Accord. The initiatives, however, were largely led by the international community. It was reported that the Foreign Ministry of Japan was sending a team to Cambodia to study the reconstruction of the war-torn country. 1
In a donor conference in Tokyo, Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk emphasized the need to assist the agricultural sector and rural peasants. Besides clearing mines, he highlighted the urgency of coming up with an expedient way of providing water to rural peasants, utilizing hand drills to dig wells in sufficient quantities, utilizing bulldozers and other machines to dig water reservoirs in large numbers, and building as many dams as possible. He prioritized the need to rehabilitate agriculture. He asked that diversified aid be given to the majority of the population in order that they would be able to deal with different reconstruction and rehabilitation issues. 1
Cambodia received tremendous international support in its various initiatives, including the reconstruction of infrastructure and rehabilitation of those displaced during the war. At the Tokyo donor conference held on June 21-22, 1992, the donor community pledged $880 million in aid. The conference concluded with the Tokyo Declaration. 2
On July 20, 1993, the Cambodian and Japanese governments agreed to cooperate on the construction and restoration of 37 km of roads and 14 bridges. 1
On August 19, 1993, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) said it would strengthen its cooperation on Cambodia’s postwar reconstruction ahead of the establishment of a JICA office in Cambodia in September. 2 The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had been the life-support system for the Cambodian economy, which was in critical condition. As the removal of UNTAC drew near, Sam Rainsy, Finance Minister of UNTAC, issued calls for continued international aid to assist in repairing and building up Cambodia’s infrastructure. Cambodia had prioritized agriculture as the centerpiece of its economic reconstruction. More than 80% of the population was engaged in farming and agriculture contributed to about 45% of the nation’s GDP. Cambodia exported rice in the 1960s, but in 1993 was unable even to meet the annual demand for domestic consumption (2.5 million tons) and had to rely on foreign donations of about 200,000 tons. Inadequate irrigation facilities and insufficient use of agrochemicals had caused the per-hectare harvest to fall to 1.2-1.4 tons, a quarter of the Japanese standard. Cambodia aimed to become a rice exporter by the end of 1995 by increasing the amount of land cultivated. 3
At a donor’s conference in Tokyo in March 1993, Cambodia secured 773 million US dollars for reconstruction projects. But reconstruction remained a daunting project due to the elusive political stability in post-UNTAC Cambodia. To reform and restructure the economy, on December 16, 1994, Cambodia signed loan agreements worth 44 million dollars with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 1
It was reported that the first prime minister of the Royal Cambodian Government suggested that Japan choose their own projects and pay for them themselves without giving financial aid to the Cambodian government. There was growing concern regarding the corruption in the government agency. 1
After nearly 25 years of war, the path of Cambodia’s reconstruction and economic development was long and difficult. The real problem facing Cambodia was poverty. The people in the countryside lacked food and water. According to the Christian Science Monitor report, the Cambodian economy as a whole was expanding – investment was up and inflation was down – but major foreign-backed projects were under scrutiny and ordinary people were complaining more loudly than ever about their prospects. 2 During the donor’s conference, Cambodia received $1.35 billion in commitments from the international community. 3 “Japan, ASEAN countries, and Cambodia had initiated their tripartite cooperation to help the reconstruction of Cambodia with the emphasis on communities. The tripartite cooperation programme is regarded as a model for Cambodia’s rural development centre to be set up” (BBC, 1995). 4
According to an E.U. statement, between 1992 and August 1996 the European community had committed over 200 million dollars to Cambodia in the fields of demining, rural development, human resources development, health, and environment. 1 Special attention was given to rural development in Cambodia’s post-war reconstruction and development process. Hun Sen, the second prime minister of Cambodia, said that socio-economic development in rural areas was a powerful way to improve the livelihood of the people and thwart the influence of the Khmer Rouge. 2
Another conference of donor countries met in Paris on July 1-2, 1997. In the multilateral donor meeting, Cambodia was expected to win international aid commitments of about 449 million dollars. In the conference, Cambodia was told to put its house in order or face dwindling support. Donor countries also criticized Cambodia for spending too much money on its security forces. 1 On July 7, 1997, Hun Sen, the leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in a brutal, bloody coup, which created resentment in the donor community. This impacted economic and infrastructure reconstruction efforts.
Notwithstanding the political instability or uncertainty after the coup, Cambodia’s strongman vowed to continue with economic and infrastructure development efforts. He proposed measures to bring back foreign investors, including eliminating illegal tax collections, cracking down on kidnappings of businessmen, and the implementation of new infrastructure projects and judicial reform. 1
In a donor conference held on Feb 25-27, 1999, Cambodia received pledge support of $470 million from the international community.
The Malaysian Prime Minister and Cambodian Prime Minister held a talk on the possibility of Cambodia’s entry into ASEAN. In the meeting, the Malaysian Prime Minister pledged that Malaysia would look into Cambodia’s request for training in industry, foreign policy, oil, and gas, as well as agriculture. This training included establishing water resources and building dams and water catchment areas. The Cambodian Prime Minister also asked for credit to finance such endeavors. Despite the economic downturn in the region, Malaysia continued to invest in the Cambodian project, with 31% of its total foreign direct investment going to Cambodia. 1
After attaining political stability, Cambodia continued to receive external support of its efforts to rebuild its economy and infrastructure. Ariston Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian-based multi-national corporation, has revived its massive 1.3 billion US dollar (S$ 2.2 billion) infrastructure project in Cambodia, the biggest source of foreign investment in the country. 1 In September 2000, the Asian Development Bank had approved a 16 million dollar loan for a package of infrastructure and training programs to help farmers in the Cambodian province of Kompong Thom increase their incomes by 40 percent. 2 Cambodia received support from the United States to rebuild its health infrastructure. 3
Note: The information above gives the amount of money pledged at the donor conferences, but not the amounts that were actually spent. On the topic of socio-economic development, the boom of the garment and tourism industries that had been taking place in Cambodia since 1993 is also worth mentioning.
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part 4. Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia
1. The primary objective of the reconstruction of Cambodia should be the advancement of the Cambodian nation and people, without discrimination or prejudice, and with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all. The achievement of this objective requires the full implementation of the comprehensive political settlement.
2. The main responsibility for deciding Cambodia’s reconstruction needs and plans should rest with the Cambodian people and the government formed after free and fair elections. No attempt should be made to impose a development strategy on Cambodia from any outside source or deter potential donors from contributing to the reconstruction of Cambodia.
3. International, regional and bilateral assistance to Cambodia should be coordinated as much as possible, complement and supplement local resources and be made available impartially with full regard for Cambodia’s sovereignty, priorities, institutional means and absorptive capacity.
4. In the context of the reconstruction effort, economic aid should benefit all areas of Cambodia, especially the more disadvantaged, and reach all levels of society.
5. The implementation of an international aid effort would have to be phased in over a period that realistically acknowledges both political and technical imperatives. It would also necessitate a significant degree of cooperation between the future Cambodian Government and bilateral, regional and international contributors.
6. An important role will be played in rehabilitation and reconstruction by the United Nations system. The launching of an international reconstruction plan and an appeal for contributions should take place at an appropriate time, so as to ensure its success.
7. No effective programme of national reconstruction can be initiated without detailed assessments of Cambodia’s human, natural and other economic assets. It will be necessary for a census to be conducted, developmental priorities identified, and the availability of resources, internal and external, determined.
To this end there will be scope for sending to Cambodia fact-finding missions from the United Nations system, international financial institutions and other agencies. with the consent of the future Cambodian government.
8. With the achievement of the comprehensive political settlement, it is now possible and desirable to initiate a process of rehabilitation, addressing immediate needs, and to lay the groundwork for the preparation of medium- and long-term reconstruction plans.
9. For this period of rehabilitation, the United Nations Secretary-General is requested to help coordinate the programme guided by a person appointed for this purpose.
10. In this rehabilitation phase, particular attention will need be given to food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of Cambodia’s existing basic infrastructure and public utilities.
11. The implementation of a longer-term international development plan for reconstruction should await the formation of a government following the elections and the determination and adoption of its own policies and priorities.
12. This reconstruction phase should promote Cambodian entrepreneurship and make use of the private sector, among other sectors, to help advance self-sustaining economic growth. It would also benefit from regional approaches, involving, inter alia, institutions such as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Mekong Committee, and Governments within the region; and from participation by non-governmental organizations.
13. In order to harmonize and monitor the contributions that will be made by the international community to the reconstruction of Cambodia after the formation of a government following the elections, a consultative body, to be called the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), should be set up at an appropriate time and be open to potential donors and other relevant parties. The United Nations Secretary General is requested to make special arrangements for the United Nations system to support ICORC in its work, notably in ensuring a smooth transition from the rehabilitation to reconstruction phases.
Donor SupportAfter the signing of the peace agreement, large amounts of aid were predicted to come into the country, but details of this aid were still unknown. 1
At a news conference on the 16th of December, Senator Evans from Australia announced that the Australian government had decided to grant Vietnam and Cambodia 4.4m Australian dollars as supplementary aid for development projects. Of the sum, 2m dollars would go to Vietnam. 2 Japan was also considering drawing up a plan to extend its financial aid, including official development assistance to Cambodia. 3 Japan also planned to host a Tokyo conference to discuss the reconstruction of Cambodia.
The International Ministerial Conference on Rebuilding Cambodia, (also referred to as the Tokyo Conference), was concluded on June 22, 1992. In a press conference, UNTAC president, Yasushi Akashi, remarked that the conference was ”an unqualified and spectacular success.” In the conference, $880 Million was pledged, which exceeded the UN Secretary-General’s request. This was due ”to the fact that some needs identified by donors go beyond the minimum needs that were included in the appeal of the Secretary-General.” Japan was the largest contributor — donating 150 to 200m dollars and they were followed by the United States who donated 135m dollars. France and the UN Development Programme were the third largest contributor, giving 57m dollars each. 1
“The rehabilitation aid was meant to support everything from road and bridge repair to well-digging and the purchase of school books and essential medicines. But of the $800 million pledged by donor nations at a conference in Tokyo in June, only about $95 million has been disbursed. According to figures compiled by the United Nations, the United States, the largest donor at the Tokyo conference, has come up with only $14 million of the $145 million it pledged. Japan, the second-largest donor, has turned over only about $9 million of the $135 million it promised.” According to the UN transitional authority in Cambodia’s rehabilitation program director, “donor nations had held back hundreds of millions of dollars in promised reconstruction aid out of a fear that the peace process will collapse”. 1 In International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia held on 10 Sept. 1993 in Paris, donor community had pledged $119 Million.
A two day international meeting on the reconstruction of Cambodia was held in Tokyo on March 10-11, 1994. It was generally believed that Cambodia would receive $773 million in aid and loans from 20 nations, the European Union and 9 international organizations. According to the Foreign Ministry Office of the Government of Japan, most of the assistance pledged at the second meeting of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia, was in addition to another $880 million pledged at the 1992 Tokyo conference and the $119 million pledged at the first ICORC meeting held in Paris last September (1993). 1
According to the Straits Time Report, half of the 880 million aid pledged during the 1992 Tokyo conference was paid out. 2
In order to reform and restructure the economy, on December 16, 1994, Cambodia signed a set of loan agreements worth 44 million dollars with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. 3
A two-day international conference on aid to Cambodia opened in Paris on March 14, 1995 with representatives from some 40 countries and international organizations in attendance. This was the third international conference regarding aid to Cambodia. During the conference, donor countries agreed on a total of 473 million dollars to be given during1995 and 877 million dollars to be given during 1996. 1
Following the three donor conferences, there was no major support pledged in the year 1996. However, the Cambodian dissidents called on Australia and other western governments to tie future aid to Cambodia to its agreement to continued free elections. 1
Another conference of donor countries met in Paris on July 1-2, 1997 (three days before the coup). In the multilateral donor meeting, Cambodia was expected to win international aid commitments of about 500 million dollars. In the conference, Cambodia was told to put its house in order or face dwindling support. Donor countries also criticized Cambodia for spending too much money on its security forces. 1
There were no major donor support activities reported in 1998, except aid given to hold elections. It was reported that Japan would expand economic development aid to Cambodia if the elections were found to have been free and fair. 1
During the Tokyo donor conference held on Feb 25-27, 1999, 16 donor nations and international organizations approved a $470 million aid package to Cambodia. On Feb 25, Cambodia and the International aid organizations and donor countries decided to set up a monitoring body that would hold quarterly meetings to assess Cambodia’s progress in implementing the reforms that were a condition for continued economic assistance.
The Consultative Group (CG) meeting between the countries and communities on aid for our Kingdom of Cambodia was held in Paris on 25-26th May. At the CG meeting, 16 countries and seven international institutions pledged 603 million dollars in development aid for Cambodia for the year 2000. 1
The World Bank also pledged 15 million dollars to assist Cambodia in the demobilization of its army. 2
PARIS AGREEMENT
Part 4. Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia
2. The main responsibility for deciding Cambodia’s reconstruction needs and plans should rest with the Cambodian people and the government formed after free and fair elections. No attempt should be made to impose a development strategy on Cambodia from any outside source or deter potential donors from contributing to the reconstruction of Cambodia.
13. In order to harmonize and monitor the contributions that will be made by the international community to the reconstruction of Cambodia after the formation of a government following the elections, a consultative body, to be called the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), should be set up at an appropriate time and be open to potential donors and other relevant parties. The United Nations Secretary General is requested to make special arrangements for the United Nations system to support ICORC in its work, notably in ensuring a smooth transition from the rehabilitation to reconstruction phases.
Arms EmbargoThe Paris agreement had strictly banned all parties from seeking outside military assistance. However, UNAMIC had sent military liaison units to only the general military headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties. In addition, teams deployed to two forward positions, Battambang and Siem Reap, which were to be main bases for the mine-awareness programme.
UNTAC had set up checkpoints along the borders between Cambodia and its three neighboring countries. Mobile military units had also been employed to monitor and investigate whether there are foreign troops remaining in Cambodia. UNTAC took these initiatives to verify not only the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops but also to make sure that the Cambodian parties would not get any military support from outside. 1
“A U.N.-mandated oil embargo against Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge guerrillas took effect Friday, but officials were doubtful it would be effective. The embargo, approved by the Security Council on Nov. 30, is intended to pressure the Khmer Rouge to stop undermining U.N. efforts to bring peace to Cambodia after 13 years of civil war. A ban on log exports, imposed by Cambodian leaders to save their nation’s forests from depletion, also went into effect.” 1 This embargo against Khmer guerrillas, however, was different from the armed embargo which went into effect immediately after the signing of the peace agreement in Paris.
With the withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia after holding constituent assembly elections in May 1993, this embargo should be coded “ended.”
With the withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia after holding constituent assembly elections in May 1993, this embargo should be coded “ended.” The Australian Government provided $5 million in military aid — however guns and ammunition will not be supplied. 1
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PARIS AGREEMENT
Annex 2
Article VII. Cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian Parties
1. All Parties undertake, from the time of the signing of this Agreement, not to obtain or seek any outside military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and military equipment from outside sources.
2. The Signatories whose territory is adjacent to Cambodia, namely, the Governments of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, undertake to:
a) Prevent the territories of their respective States, including land territory, territorial sea and air space, from being used for the purpose of providing any form of military assistance to any of the Cambodian Parties. Resupply of such items as food, water, clothing and medical supplies through their territories will be allowed, but shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-paragraph c) below, be subject to UNTAC supervision upon arrival in Cambodia;
b) Provide written confirmation to the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, not later than four weeks after the second phase of the ceasefire begins, that no forces, arms, ammunition or military equipment of any of the Cambodian Parties are present on their territories;
c) Receive an UNTAC liaison officer in each of their capitals and designate an officer of the rank of colonel or equivalent, not later than four weeks after the beginning of the second phase of the ceasefire, in order to assist UNTAC in investigating, with due respect for their sovereignty, any complaints that activities are taking place on their territories that are contrary to the provisions of the comprehensive political settlement.
3. To enable UNTAC to monitor the cessation of outside assistance to all Cambodian Parties, the Parties agree that, upon signature of this Agreement, they will provide to UNTAC any information available to them about the routes and means by which military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and military equipment, have been supplied to any of the Parties. Immediately after the second phase of the ceasefire begins, UNTAC will take the following practical measures:
a) Establish checkpoints along the routes and at selected locations along the Cambodian side of the border and at airfields inside Cambodia;
b) Patrol the coastal and inland waterways of Cambodia;
c) Maintain mobile teams at strategic locations within Cambodia to patrol and investigate allegations of supply of arms to any of the Parties.
UN Transitional AuthorityThe Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council authorize the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), to become operational as soon as the Paris Agreement was signed in October 1991. The Security Council, in its resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, authorized UNAMIC as recommended by the Secretary-General. UNAMIC became operational on 9 November 1991 when Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) assumed his role as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC in Phnom Penh. Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), Senior Military Liaison Officer, assumed command of the military elements of UNAMIC on 12 November and, on the same day, an air operations unit contributed by France arrived in Phnom Penh. UNAMIC was designed to be absorbed into the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once UNTAC was established. Strength Initial authorization: 116 military personnel (50 military liaison officers, 20 mine-awareness personnel, 40 military support personnel); there was also provision for approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff. 1
Once the mission began, however, it quickly became apparent that there was an urgent need for a major de-mining effort. To this end the Security Council passed Resolution 728(1992) on January 8, 1992. This resolution expanded the size of the military personnel to 1,090. 1
On February 19, 1992, the Secretary-General submitted the implementation plan for UNTAC as well as an indication of administrative and financial aspects to the Security Council. By resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February, the Security Council established UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months. All the responsibilities of UNAMIC were resumed by UNTAC. 2
Civil administration component: The civil administration functions envisioned in the Paris Agreements provided for UNTAC to exercise control over existing administrative structures that would have an impact on the outcome of the elections. As provided by the UNTAC plan, special representative of the UN secretary-general in Cambodia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, stated at a 26th June (1992) press conference that the UNTAC would start taking control of the civil administration of all factions on July 1, 1992. “Mr Yasushi Akashi said that the control of the civil administration was a most necessary factor leading towards the creation of a neutral ambience for free and fair elections in Cambodia. He said that according to the Paris accords, the four Cambodian factions agreed to let the UNTAC control five ministries, namely the Ministries of National Defense, Finance, Information, Foreign Affairs and Public Security.” 3
Civilian police component: The Paris Agreement had the provision of UNTAC supervision and control of a civilian police force in Cambodia.
On March 18, 1992, Gen Klass Roos, chief of the civilian police of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia met with Vice-Chairman of the State of Cambodia’s Council of Ministers and Interior Minister to seek mutual understanding on a number of issues relating to the UNTAC operations in Cambodia. 4
The Secretary-General recommended a total of some 3,600 UNTAC civilian police monitors. With this number, and based on UNTAC’s preliminary estimate of a 50,000 strong Cambodian civil police, there would be one UNTAC monitor for every 15 individual local civil policemen. The structure of this component would include a policy and management unit at headquarters, 21 units at the provincial level and 200 district-level units. The main function of the UNTAC police monitors would be to supervise or control the local civil police in order to ensure that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected. To assist the monitors, codes of conduct and other operational guidelines were developed and implemented by the UN. Monitors would also assume other responsibilities relating to the elections and to security requirements within UNTAC itself. The UN Security Council had authorized for the deployment of 3,500 civilian police, out of which 3,359 were deployed as of June 1992. 5
Military Component: the military component had four main functions: (1) to verify the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; (2) to supervise the ceasefire and related measures including regrouping, cantonment, disarming and demobilization; (3) to control weapons, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance; and (4) to assist in mine-clearing, including training and mine awareness programs. The Secretary-General recommended that the military component be fully deployed by the end of May 1992 and that the regrouping and cantonment process, as well as demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the cantoned forces, be achieved by the end of September 1992.
Including military observers, 15,991 troops and observers were deployed in 1992.The UN Security Council had authorized for the maximum deployment of 15,547 toops and 893 military observers. 6
Electoral component: “The Paris Agreement entrusted UNTAC with organizing and carrying out free and fair elections in Cambodia. The Special Representative would be assisted in these responsibilities by a Chief Electoral Officer. Other personnel needs included 198 international staff operating from headquarters and from 21 provincial and municipal centers, and some 400 United Nations Volunteers operating from each of 200 districts. These personnel would undertake duties related to electoral operations, information, training, communications, compliance and complaints, and coordination. They would be supplemented by some 4,000 Cambodian personnel during the registration process, and, during the polling process, by 1,000 international supervisors and 56,000 Cambodian personnel organized into 8,000 polling teams. To maximize efficiency and minimize costs, the electoral process would be computerized. The Secretary-General recommended that registration of voters begin in October 1992 and proceed for three months, discretion being allowed to the Special Representative to extend that period if necessary.” 7
Parties to the conflict did not agree on the electoral law during the August 5, 1992 meeting of the SNC. Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia, used his power as stated in Annex 1, Part D, Paragraph 3A and adopted the law. The electoral law adopted a formula to provide voting rights to Cambodians as had been stipulated in the 1954 Cambodian Civil Code. The law required that the UNTAC would prepare elections for Cambodians living abroad, prohibited the use of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s picture as the symbol of a party on the ballots, as well as permitted amendments of the bill in accordance with the situation. 8 The PDK opposed the draft law on the grounds that it would give voting rights to the Vietnamese. This can be coded as “reform in electoral law.” The registration of voters started on October 5, 1992, and 16 parties are expected to be provisionally registered. The UNTAC also had a human rights component, Repatriation, and Rehabilitation components.
The electoral campaign officially began on April 7, and the 20 political parties participated actively. The election took place from May 23-28, 1993. In the 120 seat Constituent Assembly, FUNCINPEC won 58 seats, CPP won 51, BLDP won 10 and MOLINAKA won one seat. At a meeting of the SNC, held on 10 June and presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued a statement declaring, on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations, that the elections as a whole had been free and fair. The Security Council endorsed the results of the elections by Resolution 840 (1993) on June 15. However, during the June 10 meeting of the SNC, the CPP announced that it could not recognize the results of the elections and demanded an investigation of the irregularities that had occurred. Over time, the CPP softened its position. The duly elected Constituent Assembly began work on June 14, 1993. 1
Debate over the draft constitution began in the Constituent Assembly on 15 of September, 1993. 2 On September 21, 1993, the Constituent Assembly of Cambodia adopted a new constitution. This new constitution formally adopted a constitutional monarch. 3
Nearly all of the United Nations military force, police and civilians had left Cambodia by November 15, 1993. This was after the UN had completed its mandate. The estimated costs of the operation were $1.6 billion. 4
No further developments observed.